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Legal Challenges to Freedom of the Press
in the Americas
JAIRO E. LANAO*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will address the issue of how the free flow of informa-
tion is obstructed by the existence of numerous laws in the majority of
civil law countries' in the Western Hemisphere. It will also address the
common treatment that most of these countries share with regard to the
legal schemes that govern press freedom and the exercise of journalism.2
This article will examine the major pitfalls of the substantive and proce-
dural laws that affect the newsgathering ability of the print media and
their ability to publish information without major restraints. It will also
consider other factors that are critical to press freedom, such as the role
of the judiciary branch.
This legal analysis does not purport to reveal whether there is press
freedom in the studied countries. Rather, it is an illustration of the way
statutory schemes are laid out in those countries. The reader may then
make certain inferences from the description of the local laws, the extent
the laws affect the freedom of the media to report, and the legal con-
straints these laws place on journalists.
Encompassing two years of research, the study included input from
media law experts from all the twenty-four countries3 examined who
were interviewed using a lengthy survey on twenty-two points of the
law. Each survey contained all relevant provisions of the laws affecting
press freedom and the free exercise of journalism. The survey of each
country included a range of questions dealing with the most general con-
* Jairo E. Lanao is in-house counsel for the Inter American Press Association in Miami,
Florida. Lanao has an LL.B. from Los Andes University in Bogot,, Colombia; a J.D. and an
LL.M. in Comparative Law from the University of Miami School of Law, where he teaches a
course on freedom of the press in the Americas.
1. See generally BUTTERWORTH'S ENGLISH/SPANISH LEGAL DICTIONARY (1991) (defining
"civil law" as "legal systems based directly or indirectly on Roman Law. It is the legal systems
prevalent in Continental Europe and those of Latin America."). See also WEST'S SPANISH-
ENGLISH/ENGLISH-SPANISH LAW DICTIONARY (1992) (defining "civil law" as a legal system based
on codes of law rather than court decisions or legal precedents).
2. See generally JAIRO E. LANAO, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE LAW (1999).
3. See id. The study included: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa
Rica; Cuba; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica;
Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Puerto Rico; United States; Uruguay; and
Venezuela.
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stitutional provision to the more specific regulation of content. Twenty-
three of the countries were visited to obtain the more recent legislation,
as well as treatises on the subject matter.
At the time the study began, there was no extensive information
compiled on all the laws affecting freedom of the press and the free
exercise of journalism around the Western hemisphere. In particular,
there were few books that focused on press freedom in Latin American.
II. COMMON RESTRICTIONS TO FREE PRESS IN THE AMERICAS
A. Legal Restrictions
Once the major laws affecting the free flow of information, the
press, and the exercise of journalism of the twenty-four countries were
compiled, several conclusions were evident regarding the press and the
law.4 Criminal libel law and its close relative, the insult law, are the
most frequently utilized to attack the press. The use of these laws results
in detentions of journalists, assessment of excessive damages, and the
threat of potential jail time for such infractions. Other legal institutions
such as the right of reply, prior restraints, and judicial bans on access to
court records and public information are other causes of obstruction of
the press.
At first glance, problems arise from the poorly crafted laws
enacted, in some cases several decades ago, to establish a regulatory
scheme of the press.' The press is confronted with an extensive array of
laws that essentially criminally punish journalists and media outlets for
the publication of information. The former and, consequently, the latter
are faced with the apprehension of being prosecuted by laws that, in
many instances, appear to be ambiguous and all-inclusive.6 The content
4. See id.
5. See id. Some of the laws devised to regulate the press were enacted more than fifty years
ago or enacted during military or dictatorship regimes with very limited views of the press.
Others simply do not reflect a modern approach of the media. See, e.g., Press Law of 1925 (Bol.);
Press Law of 1967 (Braz.) (enacted during a military government); Press Law of 1944 (Colom.);
Press Law of 1962 (Dom. Rep.) (enacted during the Trujillo era); Press Law of 1975 (Ecuador);
Press Law of 1950 (El Sal.); Press Law of 1966 (Guat.); Press Law of 1885 (1986) (Haiti)
(modified during the Duvalier era); Press Law of 1958 (Hond.); Press Law of 1917 (Mex.); Press
Law of 1978 (Pan.) (enacted during a military government).
6. It is not uncommon to find statutes in any field of law in the civil law scheme that are
broad, confusing, or ambiguous. Apparently, these flaws are built into the statutory system
whereby, due to the lack of broad judicial review, the legislative branch attempts to exhaust the
subject matter when drafting laws. This is based on an understanding the limited authority of
judges to create legal standards or set mandatory case precedents in the interpretation and
application of the law. Notwithstanding, today in some cases, courts, such as the Colombian
Constitutional Court or the Argentine Supreme Court, are less tied down to the literal meaning of
the law. Because there is no stare decisis in judicial decisions in a civil law context, judges are
forced to decide the outcomes, not based on the similarity of the facts and prior decisions, but
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of speech is frequently regulated for governmental interests. Both the
journalism profession and the activity of the press is the object of regula-
tions. These limiting laws are found in a variety of statutes such as crim-
inal codes, press laws, sanitation and health codes, advertisement laws,
consumer protection statutes, and other laws of these countries. 7
As a result, the press faces prior censorship and prohibitions on
publications. On many occasions, journalists are frequently haled into
criminal courts and are forced to make personal appearances and hire
legal representation. Despite this great burden on the press, most jour-
nalists in these cases are not convicted.8
Access to criminal court records is not permitted because of the
secrecy in criminal investigations required by most, if not all, Latin
American countries.9 Restraints, however, exist in common law juris-
dictions as well.' ° For example, access to criminal court proceedings is
frequently denied and public record laws are nonexistent in Latin
America. While some laws require licensing of the press, other laws
rather by examining and applying the textual meaning of the law. All this adds rigidity to the
system.
7. See generally LANAO, supra note 2. Laws that regulate the press and journalism can be
found in the following sources: constitutions; press laws; codes of substantive criminal law and
criminal procedure; telecommunications laws; codes of youth offenders; advertisement laws;
commercial and civil codes; health and sanitation codes; electoral statutes; consumer defense
statutes; codes of military justice; intellectual property and copyright laws; administrative codes;
child protection statutes; and international laws.
8. There are several reasons for not having a full criminal trial or a final conviction in these
types of cases. First, in some Latin American jurisdictions, criminal libel is a crime requiring a
complaint by the aggrieved party before the prosecutors and the party who must be an active part
of the process until the end of the trial. Since the alleged libel cannot be officially investigated at
the complaint stage, many complainants rarely persevere until the trial stage. Another explanation
may be found in the precarious justice systems prevalent in Latin America.
9. See, e.g., COo. PROC. PEN. art. 331 (Colom.) (establishing confidentiality of the
investigative stage of legal proceedings); Law on Abuse of Advertising, art. 25 (1967) (Chile)
(empowering judges to ban reporting of certain trials under their jurisdiction). These prior
restraints are justified on grounds that such reporting could jeopardize the success of the legal
process, offend good behavior, or disrupt state security or public order. See also COD. PROC. PEN.
art. 73 (Peru) (assigning a confidential classification to the instruction or preliminary discovery
phase in criminal cases). Under this rule, a judge may order that an action be kept confidential for
a determined period of time if it is determined that disclosure could hamper the investigation or its
outcome.
10. See generally Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 300 (2002) (Can.) (criminalizing the
publication of libel known to be false); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 517 (2002) (Can.)
(enabling judges to discretionally ban publications regarding several phases of criminal
proceedings); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 539 (2002) (Can.) (preliminary hearings);
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 542 (2002) (Can.) (confessions during the preliminary
hearings); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 486(3) (2002) (Can.) (names of victims and
witnesses under eighteen in a sexual assault trial); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 648, (2002)
(Can.) (voir dire evidence in jury trials); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 649 (2002) (Can.)
(jury deliberations).
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impose access by requiring forced publications."I
Latin American framers have commonly prohibited censorship in
their constitutions, yet have included concepts that place conditions on
freedom of expression. Chile's constitution states, "Freedom of expres-
sion is guaranteed but subject to subsequent punishment for the crimes
committed." 12 Some constitutions imply that freedom of expression and
the press are subordinated to other fundamental rights.' 3 Some countries
11. See generally the right of reply in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Note that some countries have established mandatory
retraction or correction statutes that have the same application of the right of reply.
12. See CHILE CONST. art. 19, cl. 4 (ensuring to all persons the respect and protection of a
private and public life and to the honor of the person and their family). Violation of this article,
committed via a medium or communication and consisting of a false act or fact, or causing
unjustified harm or discredit to a person or family, constitutes a crime and shall be punished in
accordance with the law. Id. See also COSTA RICA CONST. art. 29 (1949) (establishing that all
individuals may communicate their thoughts in writing without any fear of censorship except for
criminal responsibility for abuse of this right and crimes against honor); EL SAL. CONST. art. 6
(1982) (establishing similar conditional rights); HAm CONST. art. 28.3 (providing that any press
offense or abuse of the right of expression be subject to the Criminal Code); MEX. CONST. art. 6
(stating that the manifestation of ideas shall not be subject to any judicial or administrative
inquiry, except in the case of offense against morality or right of others, incitement to crime or
disruption of public order and that the right to information is guaranteed by the state); PERU
CONST. art. 2, § 4 (1993) (providing that the crimes committed by means of books, the press, and
other communications media are covered by the Penal Code and are judged by the general courts).
13. See BRAZ. CONST. art. 5, § 10 (seems to subordinate freedom of expression and of the
press to intimacy, privacy, the good name and the image of persons). COLOMBIA: The 1991
Colombia Constitution provided expressly for the right to privacy in article 15 and contains
additional provisions dealing with this right. See COLOM. CONST. art. 21 (good reputation); id. art.
28 (individual freedom). A ruling handed down in 1992 by the Constitutional Court concluded
that in cases of conflict between the right to privacy and the right to information, the right to
privacy prevails because it is a necessary consequence of human dignity having been consecrated
as a fundamental principle and essential value. The right to privacy may be limited only to
safeguard genuine general interest as proclaimed in the Constitution. Colom. Const. Ct. J. T-414
(1992). DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Article 8, paragraph 6 of the Constitution of the Dominican
Republic declares: "Every person, without prior censorship, may freely express his ideas in
writing or any other form of expression, graphic or verbal. The law will impose sanctions when
the ideas expressed threaten the dignity and the morals of the people, the public order or the good
customs of society." GUATEMALA: Article 35 of the Political Constitution of the Republic, in
effect since 1986, stipulates that: "The expression of thought is free regardless of media, without
censorship or prior license. This constitutional right cannot be restricted by law or any
governmental disposition. Whoever, making use of this freedom, is disrespectful of privacy or
morality, shall be responsible in accordance to the law." The Press Law of 1966 (Guat.)
establishes in articles 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35 the following in pertinent part: "In accordance
with this law, the publications which abuse the freedom of expression of thought may result in
trial by jury and sanctions in the following cases: ... c) printed materials which injure morality; d)
printed materials which are disrespectful of privacy; and e) printed materials which contain grave
libels." MEXICO: article 7 of the 1917 Constitution states that: "The freedom to write and to
publish writings on any matter is inviolable. No law or authority may impose prior censorship,
require surety of authors or printers or restrict freedom to print beyond the limits of respect for
privacy, morality and public peace." PARAGUAY: The rights to uphold reputation and to privacy
are guaranteed in the National Constitution of 1992, in Article 33, On the Right to Privacy, which
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have prohibited censorship, but place further restraints on press freedom
by banning information that is contrary to good customs, decency, fam-
ily values, and even national symbols. 4 Moreover, the press in Latin
America is hindered by the constant threat of laws that make it difficult
to report as a watchdog on the governments and to report on matters of
public interest.15
B. Judicial Restrictions
The judiciary also poses severe restraints on the press due to its
preponderant role in adjudicating the numerous criminal offenses the
press is faced with under Latin American legal schemes. 6 This is
aggravated due to the lack of independence of the judiciary and, in gen-
eral, the crisis in most Latin American justice systems. Judges also have
vast discretion in some cases in determining which trials may be covered
by the news. In addition to citing the numerous criminal offenses jour-
nalists may be prosecuted for the dissemination of information, the
study also cites several instances of broad judicial powers concerning
the media that may lead to abuse. For example, under the 1925 Bolivian
Press Law, there is a special system of justice for the offenses commit-
says: "Personal and family intimacy, and respect for privacy are inalienable. The conduct of
persons, so long as it does not affect public order as established under the law or the rights of
others, shall be exempt from public authority. The right to protection of privacy, dignity and
reputation of persons is guaranteed." These rights by way of legal scholarly interpretation are
meant to supersede the freedom of expression and of the press.
14. See Press Law of 1967 art. 11 (Braz.) (prohibits information that offends morality or good
customs); HOND. CONST. art. 75 ("The law that regulates freedom of speech may establish prior
censorship, in order to protect the ethical and cultural values of society, as well as the rights of
people such as infants, adolescents and the youth").
15. See the country by country reports by the INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, PRESS
FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2001). See Argentina report on the
misguided use of the defense of the fair report privilege (Campillay defense) at 18; see the Brazil
report on the Gag Law bill that forbids the authorities to report to the press on matters that are
being currently investigated by the police, justice and administrative personnel at 24; see the Chile
report on the application of the State Security Law against journalists of La Tercera accused of
attacking the decorum of a high ranking official at 44; see the Costa Rica report on the forced
publication of a ten-page reply of a grievance against La Nacidn and the suspended sentence
against a journalist under criminal libel at 57, 59; see the Ecuador report on the enactment of
several anti-press bills at 73; see the El Salvador report on the application of several provisions of
the Criminal Code of Procedure that enable judges to discretionally issue gag orders and close
courtrooms to the public at 75; see the Paraguay report on the accusations before a criminal court
of several newspaper directors and journalists for alleged violations of the electoral ban and
defaming high officials at 110-112; see the Peru report on a court order to temporarily seize the
presses of two opposing newspapers to the government at 115; see the Venezuela report on the
criminal libel suits against several newspapers at 140.
16. See Press Law of 1967, art. 11 (Braz.) (prohibiting information that offends morality or
good customs); HOND. CONST. art. 75 (allowing for prior censorship to protect the ethical and
cultural values of society, as well as the rights of people such as infants, adolescents, and the
youth).
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ted by the media.' 7 The aforementioned press law brings a special struc-
ture of tribunals to judge the offenses committed through publications
and by journalists. It also sets forth the duty of the jury to adjudge the
press crimes; but criminal libel can be tried by the special tribunals or by
the ordinary justice in the case of non-media defendants. Under the 1988
Brazilian Constitution, media defendants are punished by high moral
damages (this may be compared to punitive damages in the United
States) for committing the criminal offenses.' 8
The Colombian courts have passed important rulings with respect
to media liability. In a September 1999 decision, the Colombian
Supreme Court established a journalistic tort liability as a result of
imparting inaccurate or libelous information going beyond any specific
statute and applying strict liability standards. Though, it stated that it
was in accordance with article 55 of Law 29 of 1944 the Colombian
Press Law, it was viewed as an abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has attempted to estab-
lish liability based on negligence for inaccurate information pursuant to
duty of the press to divulge accurate information in accordance with
Article 20 of the Colombian Constitution. It has been understood in
Colombia that the right to information includes freedom of the press and
that this freedom must be exercised accurately and impartially. To put it
another way, the Constitutional Court, in indicating that there are two
aspects to freedom of information, has declared, "This is, in principle,
the freedom to inform - that is to impart the information, which in turn
involves the freedom to receive the information."' 9 The court has reaf-
firmed that Article 20 of the Constitution imposes two limits or assump-
tions regarding the right to know: ". . .that news reports should reflect
the truth and that they should show impartiality and balance. ' 2° The
court further held that "The media must also perform a social role,
which is to keep the public well informed about all the events or devel-
opments that occur in the daily life of the community. They must not
distort the facts, because in that way society would not receive informa-
tion, but rather disinformation about what has occurred."'2' Although the
Court has clarified the difference between accuracy and impartiality,22
saying that facts require accuracy and opinions require impartiality, it is
17. Press Law of 1925, art. 28 (Bol.).
18. BRAZ. CONST. art. 16, §§ II, IV. Moral damages are also available under the Press Law
and the Brazilan criminal code. See, e.g., Press Law of 1967, art. 18 (Braz.). The civil code does
not add any clarity. See C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1547 (Braz.).
19. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 603 (Sept. 9, 1997).
20. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 603 (Oct. 27, 1992).
21. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 603 (Oct. 27, 1992).
22. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 080 (Feb. 26, 1993).
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a matter of concern to see a number of legal actions being taken based
on an interpretation of what is regarded as false information and what
corresponds to the facts. It is important to stress that the same Court has
said that protection of honor and good name limits the right to inform
and that it is incumbent upon the media to protect these by ensuring that
news reports are not based on false facts-truthful information; that the
reporter in publishing the story be unaware it was false-impartial infor-
mation; that the news medium having checked was able to show it was
false-complete information; and that the information reflected the
actual facts-accurate information.23 The Court, in the same ruling,
held that information is unbiased when the manner of its transmission or
presentation is not slanted, tendentious or arbitrary. The foregoing indi-
cates that perhaps the legal standard of scrutiny in gauging the truthful-
ness of a report and the due care on the part of the news medium or
journalist is not being merely negligence, but being gross negligence or
recklessness.
The Constitutional Court has indicated in its rulings that there are
constitutional limits to freedom of expression and of information. The
first of these limits is the duty of the media to publish information that is
not inaccurate in particular when it has to do with the personal honor
and good name of a person.24 In addition, it has held that the limit
implicit in these freedoms is personal honor and a good name. As
already noted, the limit to the right of information is that of truthful
information-that reports not be based on false facts; that the journalist
be unaware of the falsity of the information-unbiased reporting; that
the news medium would, with a minimum of checking, not have discov-
ered the falsity-complete information; and that the information corre-
spond exactly to the actual facts-accurate information. These limits
of truth and accuracy would not appear to apply in the case of criticism
of people in public life, as the degree of protection of personal honor and
good name is lessened when there is a relevant interest and a greater
degree of tolerance is required of such persons, in light of the typical
debate of political issues.26
The judiciary in other Latin American countries has been a focal
point of criticism by free speech experts by virtue of the existence of the
right of reply that may force the media defendant to publish the entire
text of a court decision involving criminal libel cases. An example of
such a law is article 155 of the Criminal Code of Costa Rica, which
23. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 080 (Feb. 26, 1993).
24. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 609 (Dec. 14, 1992).
25. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 080 (Feb. 26, 1993).
26. Id.
2002]
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authorizes such publications if the aggrieved party requests so. 27 Such
right of reply for inaccuracies or grievances is guaranteed by a summary
process that can be ordered within three days of the libelous or inaccu-
rate publication. The reluctance to comply with the court order may lead
to two years of incarceration for contempt should the Constitutional
Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court deem it necessary.28 Under
article 415 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Ecuador, a special pro-
cedure is established in the case of criminal libel when allegedly com-
mitted by news media.29 There is a a special procedure and trial in the
case of offenses against honor when allegedly committed by news media
according to article 415.
In Guatemala, the latter is not unusual, in light of the special press
juries that must be convened prior to the subsequent criminal trial when
committed by a media defendant. 3° The jury decides whether an offense
may have been committed, and if so will remand the criminal cause to a
criminal court for the respective trial.3 ' In reality, the special juries have
never been functional, but are utilized as threats to the press. The same
press law establishes an ethical tribunal that may compel the media
defendant to publish any rectifications or replies regarding the criticism
of a public official.32
In Honduras, a director of a medium may be incarcerated up to
three months for not complying with a court order to publish the corre-
sponding retraction or reply.33 Upon the plaintiff's request, the medium
can be compelled to publish the entire text of the court decision that
finds the media defendant guilty of criminal libel. These publications
create the extreme burden of occupying several pages of the newspaper.
Similarly restrictive laws exist in El Salvador. Journalists may be
restrained from exercising their profession in criminal libel cases.34 Gag
orders and a private hearing may be issued under the discretion of the
judge when public morals, public interest, and state security, may be
compromised.
Paraguay also has harsh laws. The broad powers granted to the
criminal courts under the Criminal Code of Procedure of 1998 make it
plausible that judges may abuse their discretionary powers to close any
27. CODIoo CRIMINAL art. 155 (Costa Rica).
28. Id.
29. C6DIGO PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES [COD. PROC. PEN.] art. 415 (Ecuador).
30. Press Law of 1966, art. 48 (Guat.).
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 77.
33. Decree 110 of 1996, art. 165 (Hond.).
34. C6DIGO PENAL [C6D. PEN.] art. 180 (El Sal.).
35. C6D. PROC. PEN. art. 272 (1997) (El Sal.).
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public hearing, specifically to the press, when the court deems that the
honor, private lives or physical integrity of any of the parties may be
affected, or when official or private secret information, commercial or
industrial may be divulged. 36 A judge may ban any opinion in the court-
room or isolate any witness. 37  This has been frequently utilized by
judges to issue gag orders to the press as well as to keep journalists from
working as such until the orders are lifted.
Under the Peruvian Code of Criminal Procedure, an abbreviated
process is established to judge cases of criminal libel with media defend-
ants all to be completed within thirteen days, an unusually short term for
the average length of trials under Peruvian law. 38 The press laws in the
Dominican Republic 39 and Uruguay4 ° also have harsh criminal proce-
dures against journalists.
Notwithstanding legal restrictions, there is no doubt that the press is
relatively free in the Western hemisphere with the exception of Cuba.41
Press freedom is simply afforded more protection in some countries than
in others. In the majority of the countries studied, the legal provisions
discussed are, for most case, simply not enforced.
It is noteworthy to mention that the worst problem affecting press
freedom in the Western hemisphere is not the legal and judicial restric-
tions, but rather, the physical violence against the press. Countries such
as Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, and Brazil have the highest rates of
36. C6O. PROC. PEN. art. 368 (1998) (Para.).
37. Id. art. 372.
38. C6D. PROC. PEN. art. 314 (Peru).
39. Law 6132 of 1962, arts. 16 and 51 (Dom. Rep.) (special procedure exists for judging
criminal libel cases when committed by media defendants along with stiffer prison terms than set
out for non-media defendants in the Dominican criminal code); id. art. 46 (joint strict liability is
established regarding criminal libel offenses among reporters and directors/editors).
40. Press Law of 1989, art. 31 (Uru.) (judge may order forced publication of entire text of
sentence in cases of crimes of dissemination of false news and insults of public high officials).
41. See INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, PRESS FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAS, 2001
ANNUAL REPORTER (2001) (providing country by country reports); Argentina: id. at 18 (reporting
on the misguided use of the defense of the fair report privilege or "Campillay defense"); Brazil:
id. at 24 (reporting on Gag Law bill that forbids the authorities from reporting to the press on
matters that are being investigated by police, justice or administrative personnel); Chile: id. at 44
(reporting on the application of the State Security Law against journalists of La Tereca accused of
attacking decorum of a high ranking official); Costa Rica: id. at 57, 59 (reporting on the forced
publication of a ten-page reply of a grievance against La Nacion and the suspended sentence
against a journalist under criminal libel); Ecuador: id. at 73 (reporting on the enactment of several
anti-press bills); El Salvador: id. at 75 (reporting on the application of several provisions of the
Criminal Code of Procedure that enable judges to discretionally issue gag orders and close
courtrooms to the public); Paraguay: id. at 110-12 (reporting on accusations before a criminal
court against several newspaper directors and journalists for alleged violations of the electoral ban
and defaming high officials; Peru: id. at 115 (reporting on a court order to temporarily seize the
presses of two newspapers opposing the government); Venezuela: id. at 140 (reporting on criminal
libel suits against several newspapers).
20021
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murder of journalists.42 This violence, however, will not be the focus of
the paper.
III. PENALIZING SPEECH: CRIMINAL LIBEL AND INSULT LAWS
The criminalization of speech is the most serious problem that the
media faces. This includes the large number of legal provisions regulat-
ing the media, the broad and ambiguous definitions contained therein,
and the lack of legal defenses. It is also interesting to discover that in
many countries in the Americas, the press is regulated by laws specifi-
cally enacted to impose a standard of conduct on the coverage of news.
Most of these laws were passed many decades ago during military
regimes and most reflect a very restrictive scheme that purports to
impose criminal liability for abuses, inaccuracies, excesses, and non-
compliance with the legal requirements. Moreover, some of these laws
were passed more than four decades ago, when newspapers were preva-
lent and there was no cable, mass television broadcasts, or Internet. As a
result, these laws are outdated and do not reflect current societal inter-
ests and values regarding press freedom.
Such press laws have been enacted by the legislative bodies of
Bolivia,43 Brazil,44 Chile,45 Colombia,46 Dominican Republic,47 Ecua-
42. JAIRo E. LANAO, COMPARATIVE STUDY: THE PRESS LAWS AND CHAPULTEPEC
(forthcoming 2002). In addition to citing the numerous criminal offenses journalists may be
prosecuted for the dissemination of information, the study also cites several instances of broad
judicial powers concerning the media that may lead to abuse. See, e.g., Press Law of 1925, art. 28
(Bol.) (creating a special system of justice for offenses committed by the media); BRAZ. CONST.
art. 16, §§ II and IV (1988) (subjecting media defendants to high moral damages, equivalent to
punitive damages in the United States, for committing certain criminal offenses).
43. Press Law of 1925, art. 10 (Bol.) (prohibits attacks against the Constitution, in whole, or
in part); id. art. I 1 (prohibits attacking public order or advocating illegal conduct, obscenity, and
immorality); id. art. 13 (outlines the elements for criminal libel).
44. Subverting political or social order is punishable by one to four years of jail time. Press
Law of 1967, art. 15 (Braz.). Publishing or divulging state secrets, news relative to the
preparation of internal or external defense, confidential news, or information of interest to national
security is a crime. Id. art. 14. Publishing or divulging false news or distorted facts that may
provoke disturbance of the public order, distrust of the banking system, create commotion in
financial institutions or any other company that may prejudice official government entities or
other companies, or cause an appreciable disturbance in the securities market is punishable by one
to six months of jail time. Id. art. 16. Offending public morals and good customs is punishable by
three months to one year of jail time. Id. art. 17. Using money or favors as an influence to
publish or stop the publication of information or news, is punishable by four to ten years
imprisonment. Id. art. 18. Advocacy of illegal behavior is punishable by one-third of the sentence
of the principal crime, up to one year of imprisonment. Id. art. 19. If the crime is accomplished,
however, the person advocating such illegal behavior shall receive the same sentence as
prescribed for the crime. Id. Committing criminal libel, either by falsely accusing someone of a
crime or by publication, is punishable by six months to three years of jail time. Id. art. 20.
Attacking a person's reputation with offensive facts is punishable by three to eighteen months of
jail time, which is greater for media defendants than for non-media defendants. Id. art. 21.
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dor,48 Haiti,49 Honduras,"° Mexico, 5' Panama,52 and Uruguay.53 In each
Insulting the president or other high-ranking official is prohibited and punishable by a sentence
prescribed by the aforementioned articles, plus a third of the sentence for the original crime.
45. See Press Law 19.733 of 2001, (Chile) (on the freedom of opinions and of information
and the exercise of journalism); id. art. 34 (prohibiting offenses against good customs).
46. See Law No. 29 of 1944, art. 27-29 (Colom.) (criminalizing incitement to lack of
discipline or military insubordination and prohibiting the publication of false news).
47. See generally Law of Expression and Dissemination of Thought, Law No. 3162 (1962)
(Dom. Rep.) (creating a series of crimes aimed at punishing the press). For example, receiving
funds from a foreign government for a purpose other than advertising is punishable by up to two
years in prison. Id. art. 16. Criminal libel, which is applicable in cases of defamation or offenses
committed through a news medium, is punishable by longer prison sentences than under the Penal
Code which provides for special proceedings. Id. art. 51. See also id. art. 46 (strict liability for
directors, editors, reporters, printers, and distributors); id. art. 24 (prohibiting advocating others to
commit crimes against the internal state security); id. art. 27 (providing for up to two years
imprisonment for the publication, dissemination, or reproduction of false news which disrupts
public order); id. art. 26 (taking a position against public interest, good behavior, foreign
dignitaries, or the president is punishable by up to one year of imprisonment); id. art. 29
(prohibiting criminal libel, even by inference); id. art. 30 (defamation of a court, tribunal, member
of the armed forces, or police officer is punishable with up to one year in prison); id. art. 31
(criminalizing defamation of a member of Congress or a public official, and punishes such acts
with up to one year of imprisonment); id. art. 34 (prescribing up to three months of imprisonment
for defamation of the authorities mentioned above); id. art. 39 (punishing offenses committed
against foreign dignitaries with up to one year in prison); id. art. 42-43 (criminalizing the
publishing of court proceedings, releasing information about current trials, disclosing criminal
matters involving minors, or bringing sound or video equipment into a courtroom).
48. See C6D. PEN. art. 490 (Ecuador) (defines grievous, non-libelous slander); id. art. 493
(punishes those who commit libel against a public official, with up to two years of imprisonment);
id. art. 495 (prescribes a maximum of six months in prison for those who commit libel against a
private individual); id. art. 498 (referring to libel committed in a foreign publication; setting
penalties for anyone who provides such libelous information or orders its publications); id. art.
499 (prohibiting the reproduction of a libelous text or graphic, even when it has already been
published in Ecuador or abroad). The Penal Code imposes up to two years of imprisonment for
anyone who offends senior pubic officials, including those who are not necessarily high-ranking,
through threats or slander. C6D. PEN. art. 230-31 (Ecuador). Also, the Penal Code imposes up to
four days of imprisonment or severe fines upon anyone who disseminates false news or rumors
regarding national security, national honor, public order, the honor of individuals, families, or the
intimate life of families. Id. art. 606. Article 417, which contains the ambiguous term,
"immoral," broadens the definition of offenses against honor committed through the news media
to include immoral writings, dealing with obscene, dishonest, or dishonorable matters concerning
a person's private life, that are contrary to respectable behavior. Id. art. 417. See also id. art. 415
(outlines a determination of joint liability between the owners, editors, or management of a
newspaper and the author of a publication that could be seen as libelous.
49. See Press Law of 1986, art. 13 (Haiti) (provides for strict criminal liability if an editor or
manager publishes an unsigned article); id. art. 16 (criminalizing publishing charges or criminal
proceedings in a manner likely to influence a court decision, jurors, or judges; publishing the
damage awards ordered by correctional or criminal courts; fraudulently obtaining a journalist
license; publishing death threats in a news medium; publishing items harmful to morals or young
people); id. art. 18 (prohibiting the publication or transmission of information offensive to good
customs or morals); id. art. 19 (failing to publish information based on the .right of reply is
punishable by suspension of the news medium or suspension of distribution); id. art. 20 (providing
that anyone ordering the publication of defamatory information in foreign newspapers can be
subject to legal action).
50. See Press Law of 1958, art. 8 (Hond.) (criminalizing disrespect of person's private lives or
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country, jail time, fines, and even the closing of newspapers are among
the sanctions for violations of these rules.
Immense problems of definition, among others, plague the afore-
mentioned laws. There is a lot of ambiguity in the statutory language of
the laws that affect the free flow of information. Some examples are the
use of terms such as "good customs," "public morals," "integrity of the
nation," and "private lives." All of the press laws contain provisions
that prohibit publication of information varying from the dissemination
of false information to violating the public morals or good customs of
the country.54
morals by causing harm to reputation, interest, or family relations); Press Law of 1986, art. 38
(Haiti) (criminalizes the knowing publications of a false advertisement; prohibits capricious
attacks against companies for the purpose of avenging past grievances or discrediting people or
institutions; forbids advertising extortion in all of its manifestations; and makes it illegal to
publish pornographic photographs, drawings, cartoons, or obscene jokes).
51. See Press Law of 1917, art. 1-3 (Mex.) (criminalizing attacks on privacy, morality, public
peace, or public order); id. art. 2 (defining an offense against morality as offending modesty,
decency, or good habits, inciting prostitution, or encouraging the practice of licentious or
immodest acts). Article 2 also expands the definition of offenses against morality to include the
distribution or sale of items of an obscene nature. Id. See also id. art. 3 (establishing that acts
discrediting, ridiculing, or destroying the fundamental institutions of the nation amounts to an
attack against peace and order); id. art. 9 (prohibiting disclosure of crimes of adultery, offenses
against modesty, rape, or other sexual misconduct and the publishing of cases relating to divorce,
paternity, maternity, marriage annulment, or child recognition, unless consent is obtained from the
parties involved); id. art. 14-17 (holding the publisher, editor, manager, and printer to a standard
of strict liability).
52. See Law No. 11 of 1978 (Pan.). The law, although partially repealed in December 1999,
still contains a few provisions that encompass criminal offenses devised for the media. Id. For
example, when the media commits criminal offenses, the directors of the news papers are held to a
strict criminal liability standard. Id.
53. See Press Law of 1989, art. 16 (Uru.) (increasing the penalties when crimes are committed
through the press, and providing that such crimes must be investigated officiously); id. art. 19
(punishing both the knowing dissemination of false news that causes a grave disturbance in the
public order or grave effects on the state's economic interests, and the instigation of insults and
attacks on the nation, the state, or its branches of power, with up to two years of imprisonment);
id. art. 24 (providing that owners, editors, or managers concealing their positions as such will be
subjected to two years in prison).
54. See C6D. PEN. art. 111 (Arg.) (preventing the use of truth as a defense in certain slander
cases); id. art. 128 (providing for imprisonment of up to one year of anyone who publishes,
produces, or reproduces obscene books, articles, images, or objects and anyone who exhibits or
distributes them); COD. PEN. art. 162 (Bol.) (insulting or defaming a public official in the
performance of his/her duties or because of such duties).
Press Law of 1967, art. 13 (Braz.) (making propaganda so as to undermine public and social
order is punishably by one to four years' imprisonment); id. art. 22 (offending dignity or decorum
is punishable by one month to one year in prison); id. art. 23 (defaming or libeling the president of
Brazil, senior officials and foreign dignitaries, any public official with regards to his duties, or any
public body or authority increases the penalty by one-third). See supra note 44 for a description
of articles 14-21 of the Brazilan Press Law of 1967. COD. PEN. art. 331 (Braz.) (causing
humiliation, discredition, or disrespect for an official willfully, by aggressive shouting, etc.).
State Security Law, art. 4 (Chile) (crimes against state internal and external security);
CODIGO PENAL MILITAR [COD. PEN. MIL.] art. 255 (Chile) (dissemination of secret military
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information); id. at 276 (publication of information that incites to riot or disorder); id. art. 284,
417 (defamation and libel of military officers); Law No. 18,045 on Stock Market Exchanges art.
61 (Chile) (dissemination of false stock market news); C6DIGo DE SALUD art. 53-54 (Chile)
(dissemination of information that leads people to believe in curative powers of certain elements);
Law No. 19, 366 on Narcotics, art. 17 (Chile) (dissemination of information concerning
investigations into drug trafficking); Law No. 19,223 on Electronic Information, art. 1-2 (Chile)
(interception of or interference with information in the case of electronic media); C6D. PEN. art.
263 (Chile) (defamation of the president or other senior officials).
C6D. PEN. art. 122 (Colom.) (offending a diplomate); id. art. 154 (revealing secret or
confidential information by a public employee); id. art. 188 (advocating illegal behavior); id. art.
288 (imposing liability on any person who unlawfully steals, hides, misplaces, destroys,
intercepts, controls, or prevents a private communication intended for another person or unduly
becomes aware of its contents); id. art. 313-15 (criminalizing libel).
C6D. PEN. art. 152 (Costa Rica) (publication of libel proceedings); id. 387 (malicious
dissemination of false information that causes harm to the public peace, public order, etc.); id. art.
307 (offending the honor or decorum of public officials is punishable by two years in prison
under the insult laws).
C6D. PEN. art. 283 (Dom. Rep.) (writing, publishing or distributing unsigned material is
subject to up to six months in prison); id. art 285 (advocating others to commit crime through a
publication and distributing the offending matter may be subject to three months in prison); id. art.
287 (distribution or exhibition of images contrary to morals or good behavior is punishable by up
to one year in prison).
C6D. PEN. art. 493-95 (Ecuador) (anyone committing libel of an official faces imprisonment
of up to two years, while anyone committing the same offense against a private individual faces a
maximum sentence of six months in prison); id. art. 498 (punishing anyone who orders a
defamatory matter to be published abroad); id. art. 499 (criminalizing the reproduction of a
libelous text or graphic, even when it has already been published in Ecuador or abroad); id. art.
417(immoral writings by the news media that are contrary to respectable behavior, dealing with
obscene, dishonest, or dishonorable matters concerning a person's private life); id. art. 230-31
(anyone who, through threats or defamatory matter, offends senior public officials faces criminal
sanctions of up to two years' imprisonment); id. art. 606 (anyone who disseminates false
information or rumors regarding national security or honor, public order, the honor of individuals
or families or their intimate life will face up to four days of imprisonment or severe fines).
C6D. PEN. art. 177 (El Sal.) (punishing criminal libel with the maximum penalty being four
years in prison when published in writing (article 181) or is seen by unspecified number of
people); id. art. 178 (attributing to a person conduct or characteristics capable of damaging his
honor with the maximum penalty being increased from two to three years' imprisonment when the
accusation is given publicity); id. art. 179 (offending, by word or deed, the dignity or decorum of a
person with maximum penalty being increased from two to three years in prison when the
accusation is given publicity); id. art. 180 (suspension from work as a journalist when the above-
mentioned offenses are committed in a news medium); id. art. 182 (libel can be committed by
allegory, caricature, emblem, or allusion); id. art. 184 (knowingly disseminating secret or private
matter is punishable by a fine of the equivalent of thirty to fifty day's pay); id. art. 339 (offending,
by word or deed, the reputation or decorum of a public official shall face up to three years'
imprisonment); Press Law of 1950, art. 6 (El Sal.) (editors are liable for any anonymously
submitted articles in his news medium); COD. PEN. art. 396 (El Sal.) (disrespecting a national
symbol is punishable by a fine of the equivalent of ten to twenty days' pay).
C6o. PEN. art. 164 (Guat.) (libel is a criminal offense); id. art. 196 (publishing obscene
material); id. art. 222 (unauthorized public display or dissemination of correspondence, papers,
recordings or photographs).
COD. PEN. art. 313-23 (Haiti) (covering criminal libel); Press Law of 1986, art. 22 (Haiti)
(publication of case files in criminal proceedings in the case of minors carries a penalty of up to
one year in prison); C6D. PEN. art. 183-85 (Haiti) (law of contempt contained in the Penal Code
which makes contempt of public officials punishable by up to one year in prison and/or fines).
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All those prohibited publications amount to prior restraint.
A. Criminal Libel
Speech is most consistently punished through criminal actions
against the journalists and newspapers when defamation of individuals
or the publication of inaccuracies occurs. As stated above, all Latin
American countries have laws that provide for criminal libel. Surpris-
ingly, the common law jurisdictions do as well .5  Notwithstanding this
COD. PEN. 161 (Hond.) (publication or reproduction of libelous material is subject to same
penalty as authors of libelous material); id. art. 162 (libel could be committed through
representations, cartoons, comics, emblems, and allusions); id. art. 415 (refusing to publish the
reply or retraction on behalf of the plaintiff, maliciously divulge facts relative to the private life of
an individual, maliciously publish false information, inciting civil disobedience, advocating illegal
behavior, offending public morals or good customs).
COD. PEN. art. 350 (Mex.); id. art. 199-200 (showing disrespect for national symbols and of
obscenity); id. art. 211 (as amended) (disseminating private information); id. art. 403 (disclosing
results of opinion polls during election period); id. art. 189 (punishment for any of the above
offenses committed against a public official shall be increased from one to six years'
imprisonment).
Co. PEN. art. 169-94 (Nicar.) (criminal libel); id. art. 260 (establishing limitations on press
freedoms); id. art. 347 (insult laws); id. art. 560 (attacking the public morality by the use of words,
representations, paintings, emblems, acts or obscene gestures).
COo. PEN. art. 168 et seq. (Pan.) (criminalizing the disclosure of private conversations or
information); id. art. 172 et seq. (criminal libel); id. art. 372 et seq. (dissemination of false
information concerning the economy and business); id. art. 307 (criticism of the president); id. art.
308 (criticism of government agencies); Health Code of 1947, art. 171 (Pan.) (publication of
advertising and propaganda referring to hygiene, preventive and curative medicine, drugs, etc.
without the prior authorization of the Public Health Department); Electoral Law, art. 178 (Pan.)
(the dissemination of opinion polls in the ten days before elections); Decree No. 251 of 1969, art.
17 (Pan.) (offending good customs and moral behavior).
In Paraguay there is no clear distinction between libel and defamation. See COD. PEN. art.
150-52 (Para.). Additionally, the express protection of honor, reputation, and personal and family
privacy, are concepts that are reinforced in both the Penal Code and the Constitution. PARA.
CONST. art. 4.22 (1992). These protections are almost excessive. They include: Co. PEN. art.
143 (Para.) (injuriously breaching personal or family privacy is punishable by a fine); id. art. 144
(unauthorized disclosure of private communications and transmission of the private photographs is
punishable by up to two years' imprisonment); id. art. 145 (violating a confidence in any medium
shall be punishable by a fine); Law 834 of 1996, art. 324 (Para.) (violating the ban on electoral
propaganda is punishable by from one to six months' imprisonment); COD. PEN. art. 146 (Para.)
(opening a private communication or making its contents known is a violation punishable by up to
one year's imprisonment); id. at 147 (revealing a private professional secret is punishable by
imprisonment up to one year); id. art. 150-52 (publication of a libel may be punishable by up to
two years' imprisonment); id. art. 153 (denigration of a deceased person is a punishable offense).
COo. PEN. art. 130-33 (Peru) (criminal libel); id. art. 249 (the dissemination of false
information causing financial distress); id. art. 157 (collection or distribution of information
regarding religious or political convictions of private individuals); id. art. 156 (publishing aspects
of the private lives of employees is punishable by up to one year of prison); id. art. 374 (attacking
the decorum or dignity of a high public official).
55. In Canada, criminal libel is punishable by up to five years in prison Criminal Code,
R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 300 (2002) (Can.). Up to now, the statute has never been utilized against a
media defendant. In Jamaica, libel requires malice and falsehood. Puerto Rico makes defamation
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similarity, the most notable difference between common law and civil
law jurisdictions is that criminal libel is not typically enforced against
media defendants in common law countries such as the United States,
Canada, and Jamaica.
Criminal libel is most egregious when the criminal complaint is
presented by public officials against media defendants. Political dissent
should not be dissuaded by potential prosecution for libel. If such prose-
cutions become commonplace, as they have in Chile, Brazil, Panama,
and Paraguay, among others, the chilling effect may cause the media to
a punishable offense. A defendant can get up to six months in prison for publishing dishonoring
or discrediting mandatory publication of a court information about a person. 33 P.R. LAWS ANN.
§ 4101 (1984). Please note that both in state or federal courts any accusation under the color of the
aforementioned statute would most likely not pass constitutional muster under the United States'
First Amendment. The same may be said with respect to many criminal law statutes under various
state laws in the United States. Though they are still in the books, they would be probably
declared unconstitutional. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). There are several
jurisdictions with criminal libel statutes: ALA. CODE § 13A-11-163 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-13-105 (1977) (knowing publication of a libel is a minor felony); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
5101 (repealed); IDAHO CODE § 18-4801-4809 (Michie 1999); IOWA CONST., art.1 § 7 ("In all
prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it
appears to the jury that the matter charged as libelous was true, and was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4004-4006
(1995) (requires a showing of actual malice in criminal prosecutions that involve speech on
matters of public concern); Richardson v. State, 7 A. 43 (Md. 1886) (action exists for criminal
libel if the defamatory words tended to disgrace or degrade the person libeled); MICH. COMP LAWS
§ 750.370 (2001) (misdemeanor to falsely and maliciously attribute to another the commission of
a crime or infamous or degrading act); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2911 (2001) (impute to a female
a want of chastity); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 750.97, 500.2009 (2001) (false or malicious statements
concerning the financial condition of various businesses); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.765, 609.77,
628.22, 631.06 (2001); Miss. CODE Ann. § 97-3-55 (1972) (struck down under Boydstun v. State,
249 So. 2d 411, 413-14 (Miss. 1971), because it did not define the crime of libel); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 200.520-200.560 (Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL § 215.50(5)(2001) (criminal contempt if
one knowingly publishes a false or grossly inaccurate report of a court's proceedings); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-47 (2001) (a person who communicates a false and libelous statement concerning any
person or corporation to a newspaper or periodical for publication and, who thereby secures such
is guilty of a misdemeanor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 (1997) (criminal libel); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2739.99 (West 2000) (criminal libel); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 771-81 (West
2000) (criminal libel); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-150 (Law Co-op. 1985) (libel and slander defined
as uttering, circulating, or publishing any false statement or matter with malicious intent which
injures another's character); TEX. REV. FIN. STAT. ANN. § 59.002 (2001) (a felony to knowingly
communicate or induce another to communicate an untrue statement derogatory of a bank's
financial condition with the intent to injure the financial institution); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-9-
404 (1999) (criminal defamation is knowingly communicating to any person orally or in writing
any information which he knows to be false and knows will tend to expose any other living person
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-119 (Michie 1999) (derogatory
statements affecting banks); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-209 (Michie 1999) (knowingly made false
statements to the press); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-416 (Michie 1999) (use of abusive language); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (Michie 1999) (words insults or words tending to violence or breach of the
peace); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.58.010-9.58.020 (2001) (criminal libel); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 942.01 (West 1999).
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abstain from reporting on matters of general concern particularly on
political affairs.
Elimination of criminal libel has been a world cause embraced by
numerous human rights organizations in Europe and other countries.
These organizations contend that laws establishing prosecution for defa-
mation should be repealed because they insulate government officials
from criticism and obstruct reporting on public corruption.5 6 The Proc-
lamation stated that libel laws cannot be justified if their purpose or
effect is to protect individuals against harm to a reputation which they
do not have or do not merit, or to protect the "reputations" of entities
other than those which have the right to sue and to be sued. In particular,
libel laws cannot be justified if their purpose or effect is to: prevent
legitimate criticism of officials or the exposure of official wrongdoing or
corruption; protect the "reputation" of objects, such as governmental or
religious symbols, flags, or national insignia; protect the "reputation" of
the State or nation; enable individuals to sue on behalf of persons who
are deceased; or allow individuals to sue on behalf of a group which
does not, itself, have status to sue. Libel laws also cannot be justified on
the basis that they serve to protect interests other than reputation, where
those interests, even if they may justify certain restrictions on freedom
of expression, are better served by laws specifically designed for that
purpose. In particular, libel laws cannot be justified on the grounds that
they help maintain public order, national security, or friendly relations
with foreign States or governments.
Despite this consensus, criminal libel continues to exist in most
countries of the world. In the criminal libel provisions in most Latin
American countries, truth is not a defense.57 Of course, in the United
56. For a discussion of the proposed Article 19, see Article 19 International Centre Against
Censorship, International Workshop on Defamation Law, London, England (Feb. 29-Mar. 1,
2000), available at http://www.articlel9.org.
57. It is important to remember that under Latin American law, libel has three forms. The
first is a more serious offense with greater jail time and is defined in terms of falsely accusing
another of a crime. The second modality of libel is less injurious and usually involves the attack of
the person's good name or reputation. In the latter case, no legislation permits truth (exceptio
veritatis) as a defense. The third form of libel is simple defamation without attacking the
profession or character of the person. The following statutes do not allow for truth as a defense to
libel: C6D. PEN. art. Ill (Arg.); C6D. PEN. art. 131 (Braz.); CHILE CONST. art. 19 4; COD. PEN.
art. 317 (Colom.) (truth can be used as a defense in libel cases except in the case of a dismissal,
acquittal, or abandonment of proceedings, or when the alleged facts involve sexual, conjugal or
family life or the victim of a sexual crime; truth is not allowed as a defense when information is
published about a person's intimate life); COD. PEN. art. 149 (Costa Rica); COD. PEN. art. 497
(Ecuador) (truth shall not be admitted as a defense in the case of libel attacking the character of
the person); COD. PEN. art. 183 (El Sal.) (truth is a defense in certain libel cases as exoneration of
the criminal charges; it is noteworthy that Article 183 admits the truth when the facts that are the
subject of offenses concerning honor refer to prominent people and such dissemination fulfills the
function of a free flow of information in a democratic society, except when it is contrary to
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States, truth no longer has relevance in libel law because falsity is the
major concern for the plaintiff. 8 More defenses need to be developed
by the civil law legal scholars for libel law, either in the criminal or civil
treatment of the offense or abuse. 59
A defense largely needed is one of fair comment or opinion. Most
Latin American legal schemes, however, fail to provide such a defense.
Having this defense would likely reduce the amount of defamation
actions. Under American defamation law, statements of fact versus
opinions have long been object of lengthy discussion and analysis by
legal scholars and the courts.6° Since the Gertz6 case in 1974 and the
matters protected by the right to personal or family privacy); Press Law of 1962, art. 37 (Dom.
Rep.) (in the case of libel, truth is only applicable when it is sought to prove the veracity of the
alleged defamation of a public official when it has to do with the functions of the offended public
sector person or agency and cannot be used in the case of the private life of a person or when the
imputation refers to a fact that is an offense that has been subject to amnesty or statute of
limitations); COD. PEN. art. 160-62 (Guat.); COo. PEN. art. 314 (Haiti) (in libel cases, truth is not
admissible as a defense that the facts giving rise to the lawsuit are well known or have been
copied or extracted from a foreign publication, even though they may be true); COD. PEN. art. 158
(Hond.) (prohibits the use of truth as a defense in the case of injuring the reputation of public
officials); COD. PEN. art. 177 (Pan.); PARA. CONST. art. 23 (truth can be used as a defense only in
cases where a public official's honor or reputation is offended by reference to his public conduct,
not his private life); COD. PEN. art. 134 (Peru); COD. PEN. art. 336 (Uru.) (limits the use of truth in
the case of defamation and libel when it is not attributing the commission of a crime to another).
58. See REx S. HEINKE, MEDIA LAW 98-99 (1994). The common law rule that truth needed to
be plead and proved as a defense was displaced by several United States Supreme Court rulings
that have held that most defamation plaintiffs have to prove is fault to prevail. Id. Therefore, as
logic may dictate, there has to be falsity for a successful libel suit. Id. at 99. If the libel is against
a private person, the defendant must be negligent in determining whether the statement or
defamatory matter was true or false. If the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, then the
standard is actual malice. Id. The plaintiff must prove the falsity by proving that the defendant
published the statement despite knowing it was false or entertained serious doubts about its
truthfulness. Id.
See also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS,
Vol. 1 3-5 (3d ed. 1999). As noted by the author, "In the 1964 case of Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964), the Supreme Court flatly said that under the First Amendment truth could never be
actionable in any lawsuit, for defamation or otherwise." Id. This principal was unconditional so
long as the subject of the communication was of public interest. Id. Eleven years later, however,
in Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court retreated by stating,
"The Court... has carefully left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by a private person
as distinguished from a public official or public figure." Cox, 420 U.S. at 490.
59. For example, the common law treatment under Jamaican law provides for a series of
defenses such as justification, absolute privilege, qualified privilege, fair and accurate comment,
unintentional defamation, and consent. For a detailed analysis of Jamaican defenses for libel, see
LANAO, supra note 2, at 347-77. See generally SACK, supra note 58; HEINKE, supra note 58.
60. See generally SACK, supra note 58.
61. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Supreme Court observed that,
"We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However, pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges or juries but on the competition of ideas." Id. at 339-40. A syllogism was
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Milkovich62 case in 1990 the doctrine regarding the defense of opinion is
still an ongoing debate. Regardless, Latin America needs to begin an
academic discussion of these defenses63 in order to move towards elimi-
nating criminal libel altogether.64
The debate on libel defenses continues even in the United States.
American courts still question the issue regarding the distinction
between an allegation of fact and expression of opinion. Sack stated:
This distinction often depends on what is stated in the rest of the
[communication]. If the defendant accurately states what some public
man has really done, and then asserts that "such conduct is disgrace-
ful," this is merely a [a nonactionable] expression of his opinion, his
comment on the plaintiffs conduct.65
United States libel law has developed as a long line of court deci-
sions that have enriched the libel theory. In determining whether an
abuse had been committed, the courts consider both the words taken in
context and the customary usage of the words.66 Under the American
system, juries will determine whether the defamatory matter is indeed
libelous.
All of this may seem logical and elementary, but the basic notions
of establishing whether statements are defamatory, whether it is a mere
opinion that discloses all relevant information, needs to be advanced by
Latin American media attorneys and scholars. Latin American constitu-
tional scholars must devise defenses, standards of conduct, and guide-
lines for judicial review regarding freedom of speech and expression of
thought.67 Special effort should be made to develop a set of rules
construed as a result: A defamation is actionable only if it false, opinions cannot be proved false;
therefore, opinions can never be actionable, no matter how derogatory they may be.
62. Milkovich v. Lorrain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). The Milkovich Court held that there
was sufficient constitutionally-based protection for opinion otherwise firmly in place. For
example, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), established that most
statements must be proven false before liability may ensue. Therefore, protections for opinions
exists so long as the statement is not proven false. There is also protection, said the Milkovich
Court, under its cases protecting invective, a vigorous epithet, loose, figurative language, or lusty
and imaginative expression. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-23. Generally, this is speech that,
although literally containing assertions of fact, is intended to express only points of view.
63. Examples of absolute and qualified privileges in Latin American libel law are sparse.
64. In June 2000, there was a meeting of Latin American journalists and jurists in Buenos
Aires to discuss the decriminalization of libel in Argentina. The bill resulting from such meeting
of experts was debated in the Argentine Congress, but never approved.
65. See SACK, supra note 58, at 220 (quoting Leers v. Green, 131 A.2d. 781, 787 (N.J. 1957)).
66. See BARBARA DILTON, THE JOURNALISTS HANDBOOK ON LIBEL AND PRIVACY (1986) (how
to use the opinion privilege and what is typically considered opinion by the courts).
67. Without doubt one of the pillars in the development of the United States's First
Amendment safeguards has been the role of judicial review as established by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Arguably, independent judicial
review that is not typical of civil law systems contributes some degree to the formation of the
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regarding evidentiary burdens of persuasion and production guidelines
for estimation of awards for harm to reputation and other intangibles. A
comparative approach of evaluating and adopting the schemes and
experiences of other countries that provide higher levels of protection
for speech would be helpful. No one is suggesting that the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution could be transplanted success-
fully to the Latin American context, particularly in light of the American
tradition and history for its civil liberties, but there are valuable lessons
to be learned from American libel law such as the actual malice standard
of criticism of public officials, burdens of production, and damage
assessment. There is also a need for guidelines in the determination of
what is or is not defamatory matter.
B. Insult Laws
The single most disturbing law that provides for subsequent crimi-
nal punishment is the insult law. These laws are essentially criminal
libel laws that punish statements against a high-ranking government
official. Normally, insult laws increase the punishment with respect to
the common criminal libel. Of the twenty-four countries studied, seven-
teen countries have insult law provisions.68 There is no doubt that insult
societal value, protection, and legal treatment of freedom of speech and the press. It possibly
differentiates those fundamental rights in the United States from the Latin American countries. In
the latter, historically, judicial review had a later development and is currently more limited than
in the United States. The constitutionalization of libel law in the United States by virtue of New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and the constitutional judicial standard of review for
governmental regulation of speech as set forth by the strict scrutiny standard are factors that
distinguish United States libel law from Latin American libel law. That can also be professed
regarding the basic differences between American libel law and Canadian libel law as discussed
by Douglas A. Alderson in his article, The Constitutionalization of Defamation: American and
Canadian Approaches to the Constitutional Regulation of Speech, 15 ADVOCATES' Q. 385 (1993).
68. See LANAO, supra note 2; COD. PEN. art. 162 (Bol.) (violation if anyone "through any
means, libels, slanders or defames a public official while performing his duties or as a result of
them;" penalty varies depending if the acts are directed against the President or Vice President of
the Republic, ministers of State, justices of the Supreme Court or members of Congress); COD.
PEN. art. 331 (Braz.) (committing contempt of a public official in carrying out his duties is
punishable by six months to two years' imprisonment; Brazilian case law has interpreted the
offense to include any word or act bringing upon an official humiliation, discredit or disrespect, by
willful action, libelous utterances, violence, physical aggression, obscene gestures, shouting);
Press Law, art. 23 (Braz.) (penalty to be increased by one-third if the insult is committed against
the president of Brazil, senior government or foreign officials, any public official with regard to
his duties, or any public body or authority); COD. PEN. art. 141 (Braz.) (penalty for insult against
public officials); State Security Law, art. 6 (b) (Chile); COD. PEN. art. 284 (Chile) (insult); COD.
MiL. PEN. art. 263 (Chile) (all contain the concept of contempt, defining different victims of the
crime); COD. PEN. art. 307 (Costa Rica) (punishes whoever offends the honor or decorum of a
public official with a penalty from one to two years of prison); COD. PEN. art. 144 (Cuba) (defines
this offense as: "He who threatens, libels, defames, insults or slanders in any way or offends, by
speech or in writing, the dignity or decorum of an authority, public official or their agents or
assistants in the exercise of their duties or on the occasion of or by reason of them" with
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laws are extremely damaging to a free press. They obstruct investigative
reporting. They do not define the limits of what is permissible when
investigating matters of public concern. They do not permit the investi-
gation into the private lives of officials hence, hindering investigations
into corruption.
As a result of the conviction of Horacio Verbitsky, an Argentine
journalist, by the Argentine Supreme Court in 1992, for violating Argen-
tina's insult law, these laws became a focal point of human rights activ-
punishment varying based on status of insulted officials); C6D. PEN. art. 368 (Dom. Rep.)
(defamation or public slander that targets the head of state will be punished by a prison term of
three months to one year, plus a fine); id. art. 42 (allows for a special and total suspension of the
civil and political rights); id. art. 369-70 (increases penalties if insults against high government
officials or law enforcement); id. art. 30-34 (defines various penalties based on who is insulted,
including fines and prison time); COo. PEN. 230-31 (Ecuador); C6D. PEN. art. 339 (El Sal.) makes
it a punishable offense to offend by word or deed the good name or decorum of a public official in
carrying out his duties or by virtue of them; officials cannot be freely criticized for their work as
such by doing so their own good name or decorum is offended. Contra id art. 183 (protects
information and deems it lawful when the facts that are the subject of offenses concerning honor
(that is, libel) refer to prominent people and such dissemination fulfills the function of a free flow
of information in a democratic society, except when it is contrary to matters protected by the right
to personal or family privacy); C61. PEN. art. 411-12 (Guat.) (establishes contempt against the
Presidents of State Organizations and against authority); GUAT. CONST. art. 35, 2 (publications
which contain denunciations, criticisms or imputations against officials or public servants for acts
incurred in the exercise of their duties do not constitute violations of law or offenses); COD. PEN.
art. 183-85 (Haiti); COD. PEN. art. 323 (Hond.) (defines contempt as when one threatens, insults or
in any other way offends the dignity of a public authority in the exercise of their duties or as a
result of them) id. art. 323 (defines penalty for insulting the President); id. art. 325 (defines
penalty for insulting high government officials); id. art. 345 (sets penalties for insults); Press Law
of 1917, art. 2-5, 33 (Mex.) (provides for criminal punishment of up to two years' imprisonment
for those who through publications commit the crimes of discrediting, ridiculing or destroying
official institutions; makes criticism of officials in the various branches of government subject to
charges being laid and criminal prosecution, thus restricting freedom of expression and press
freedom in an extreme manner); CODIO CIVIL [C.P.D.F.] art. 189 (Mex.) (punishment increased
to one to six years' imprisonment when the offenses are committed against public officials); id.
art. 191, 200, 221 (provide for several years' imprisonment for those who commit insult to
national symbols, publication of obscene material or divulge private conversations); COD. PEN.
art. 347 (Nicar.) (insult defined as (1) challenging a public official to a duel, libel, slander or
insult, by word or deed, threaten a public official; (2) seriously disrupting a court or tribunal
proceedings and anywhere else authorities or public officials may be carrying out their duties; (3)
bearing arms, without legal authorization, openly or concealed, in the Congressional chamber or
any legislative chamber or courtroom; (4) preventing a public representative or official from going
to his chambers or office; (5) openly disobeying authority); id. art. 348 (punishable by
imprisonment of six months to four years) COD. PEN. art. 307-08 (Pan.) (contempt against the
President); COD. PEN. art. 347 (Peru) (threat or insults against public official subject to
incarceration of no more than three years unless official is President); COo. PEN. art. 173 (Uru.);
COD. PEN. art. 223 (Venez.) (defines contempt as an offense in the presence of a government
official and motivated by his official status); id. art. 26 (sets penalties); id. art. 227 (the accused
will not be permitted to introduce any evidence about the truth nor about the notoriety of the facts
or the alleged flaws of the offended party); id. art. 228 (standard not applied in the case of an
official who has abused his authority).
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ists.69 His case was heard by the Organization of American States
Commission on Human Rights. In 1994, it resulted in the Commission
issuing a report declaring the incompatibility of insult laws in light of
the guarantees of freedom of expression contained in Article 13 of the
American Convention of Human Rights. 70 The report concluded that
insult laws, or as stated in the report "contempt laws," afford public
officials an unjustifiably unique protection that other individuals of soci-
ety do not have. It also demonstrated that the fear of incarceration dis-
suaded individuals to express political commentary and their opinions
on matters of public interest, especially since the laws often did not dis-
tinguish between facts and opinions.
The Commission's report provoked such a battle, that in 1994 the
Argentine government passed a law repealing its insult law provision
contained in the Argentine Criminal Code.7' Other countries have fol-
lowed the Commission's recommendations, leading to positive changes
both in Latin American case law and legislation. One example is the
repeal of the Paraguayan insult law with the issuance of the 1998 Penal
Code. It is difficult, however, to know whether the elimination of the
insult law was intended and a direct result of lobbying by legal experts
and human rights organizations. Argentina went further than the mere
repeal of its insult law. It adopted the actual malice standard found in
United States libel.72  The New York Times standard revolutionized
American libel law.73 It set a standard of behavior for plaintiffs in the
case of possible defamation suits where public officials are involved.
The impact of New York Times has yet to be realized in Latin
America. The Colombian Constitutional Court has sustained the follow-
ing regarding criticizing public officials:
Nevertheless, if the criticism - at times derogatory or insulting -
of persons in public life, the amount of protection of the honor and
69. See Horacio Verbitsky, Restricting News Through Insult Laws, 105th World Press
Freedom Committee (2000).
70. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Compatibility of Contempt (Insult Laws) Laws and
the American Convention on Human Rights, at 210-23, OEA/ser L/V/II.88, doc. 9 rev. (1995).
71. Law 24,198, published June 3, 1993, repealed the criminal insult law embodied in Article
244 of the Argentine Penal Code.
72. See ADOLFO ROBERTO VASQUEZ, LIBERTAD DE PRENSA 94-96 (1998). The author, a
current justice of the Argentina Supreme Court, documents the cases that have adopted the actual
malice standard of the New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Vdsquez states that
under Morales Sold, Joaqufn Miguel s/injurias and Ramos, Juan Jos6 c/LR3 Radio Belgrano y
otros the actual malice standard was embraced under the majority votes.
73. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times Court
required that, in order to succeed in an action for defamation, a public official-plaintiff must plead
and prove, "that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. Because New York
Times places this burden on the plaintiff, greater public scrutiny is allowed.
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good name is lessened when there is a relevant public interest and a
greater degree of tolerance can be demanded of said persons in the
interests of public political debate. Any person who enters public life
and thus voluntarily exposes himself to social judgment thereby
abandons part of the constitutionally protected private sphere. 4
It is evident that public officials must become more tolerant and should
be subject to greater public scrutiny though it is still unclear as to what
extent such scrutiny can reach. Latin American legal scholars must
develop more legal doctrine on this point. There are far too many politi-
cians utilizing either the criminal libel provisions or insult laws against
journalists who criticize them.
Regrettably, not all countries seem to be advancing at the same
pace as the Colombian Supreme Court. Recently, Jamaican legislators
introduced an anti-corruption bill that would punish the press with jail
time for revealing any crucial information relative to an ongoing corrup-
tion investigation of public officials. 75  Legislators must carefully
examine the guidelines of such anti-corruption legislation to avoid
obstructing investigative reporting.
IV. LICENSING AND PRIVACY
A. Licensing
There are eight countries that have established licensing require-
ments for journalists: Bolivia, 76 Brazil, 77 Chile78 Ecuador,79 Haiti,8"
74. Colom. Const. Ct. J. 80 (Feb. 26, 1993).
75. See Corruption Prevention Act of 1999 (Jam.). Under the Corruption Prevention Act,
specifically under section 6(2) and 6(3), a person is guilty of an offense if the person reveals to
another any document or information related to an investigation into corruption, if the person
should know or have a reason to know that the information is related to an investigation of
corruption. A violator can be subject to fines and incarceration up to three years.
76. See Press Law of 1925, art. 27 (Bol.); Law 495, art.l-2 (Dec. 29, 1979) (Bol.). See also
Press Law of 1925, art. 27 (Bol.). Both statutes make it mandatory for journalists to be licensed in
order to work professionally.
77. Prior registration is required in order to work as a journalist under terms of Decree Law
972 of 1969 and Decree 83,284 of 1979 (Braz.). Article 4 of Decree Law 972 and Article 4 of
Decree 83,284 set out the documentation that must be submitted to the Labor and Social Security
Ministry in order to practice journalism. Among these requirements is having a university degree
or its equivalent years of experience.
78. Law 19.733 of 2001, Art. 5 (Chile) (requires a university degree to be a professional
journalist).
79. See Journalists' Professional Practice Law of 1975 (Ecuador). The membership
requirement requirements for a provincial guild are non-obligatory. However, the requirement for
someone with a journalism degree to work as a journalist under the same law indicates that
membership is an essential prerequisite, therefore, without a guild membership, one cannot
practice as a journalist. Similarly, the membership requirement appear to be obligatory only for
the public sector.
80. Under terms of the Haitian Press Law of 1986, a license is required to be a professional
journalist. To obtain one, an applicant must have a university degree or its equivalent. A foreign
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Honduras,81 Nicaragua,82 and Venezuela.83 Without either a university
degree, a number of years of practical experience, or belonging to a
professional guild, journalists are not permitted to work as such profes-
sionally. The licensing of journalists became an issue of controversy in
1983, when the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica imposed a three-
month sentence on Stephen Schmidt, a reporter for the Tico Times, for
practicing journalism without belonging to the Costa Rican journalist
guild.84 Later in 1985, the Costa Rica government consulted the Inter
American Court of Human Rights regarding the local law mandating
such association and Costa Rica's rights and duties in light of the Amer-
ican Convention of Human Rights. The resulting opinion stated that
mandatory licensing was incompatible with Article 13 of the American
Convention of Human Rights which guarantees freedom of expression.
journalist wishing to practice his profession in Haiti must send an application to the Ministry of
Information and Coordination, and upon presentation of his journalist card, he will receive an
accreditation card valid for the duration of his stay in the country. Id. art. 9. Only persons holding
a professional identification card may avail themselves of the title of journalist. Id. art. 10.
81. See Organic Law of the Guild of Journalists (Hond.). It is mandatory for journalists to
belong to the Guild of Journalists. The Organic Law of the Guild states:
The Guild of Journalists of Honduras is hereby created as a corporate entity and
with its own patrimony, and whose organization and operation shall be ruled by the
Law of Obligatory Professional Association, by this Law, its regulations, and the
provisions of all other applicable laws. The legal domicile of the Guild of
Journalists shall be the capital of the Republic.
82. See Law of the Professional Guild of Journalists (Dec. 13, 2000) (Nicar.).
83. Law for Practicing Journalism of 1994 (Venez.). Article 2 requires that a candidate
wishing to work as a journalist must have a degree in journalism, communications or equivalent,
conferred in the country by a university, or a degree legally revalidated; the candidate must also be
a member of the National Society of Journalists and the Social Security Institute for Journalists.
84. See Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Nov. 13, 1985). Oddly, Schmidt's
case was taken before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate the
violation of his freedom of expression. The Commission found there was no violation of his right
under the American Convention of Human Rights. Id. Under Costa Rican Law 4420 of 1969,
Organic Law of the Association of Journalists (English language translation of colegio has been
guild), Stephen Schmidt was indicted and convicted for practicing journalism without membership
to the local guild. See Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Nov. 13, 1985)
(compulsory membership in an association prescribed by law for the practice of journalism); see
also AMERICAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTs art. 13, 29.
85. See Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Nov. 13, 1985). The court stated:
It follows from what has been said that a law licensing journalist, which does not
allow those who are not members of the [guild] to university graduates who have
specialized in certain fields, is not compatible with the [American Convention on
Human Rights]. Such a law would contain restrictions to freedom of expression that
are not authorized by Article 13(2) of the Convention and would consequently be in
violation not only of the right of each individual to seek and impart information and
ideas through any means of his choice, but also the right of the public at large to
receive information without any interference.
Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Piza Escalante wrote, "Freedom of expression is a basic right
that every individual possesses by the simple fact of his existence, whose exercise cannot be
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In the aftermath of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights'
opinion, several countries have taken measures to repeal mandated
associations of journalists. First, the Supreme Court of the Dominican
Republic in a 1989 ruling overturned Law 148 of 1983, which had cre-
ated the Dominican Journalists Guild.86 In so doing, the court elimi-
nated the requirement of obligatory membership. Second, the Costa
Rican Supreme Court in May of 1995 decided to repeal the 1969 law
requiring the obligatory licensing of all journalists wishing to work in
the country. In 1998, the Colombian Constitutional Court declared
unconstitutional Law 51 of 1975 which required that journalists have a
university degree to qualify for professional license.8 7 Finally, the Pan-
ama government signed a law that repealed Law 68 of 1978 mandating
the licensing of journalists in December of 1999, even though the licens-
ing requirement had never been enforced. 88
Mandatory licensing continues to be a heated topic for human
rights advocates around the Western hemisphere. Some legislators,
however continue to include provisions requiring licensing or member-
ship requirements for journalists into legislation.89 Such legislation is a
step backwards for freedom of the press in the Americas. The Nicara-
gua legislative assembly recently passed a law mandating association
membership for journalists in the country. The same occurred in Chile
with passage of Law 19.733 of 2001 that mandates licensing of journal-
ists. Notwithstanding, mandatory licensing or obligatory association
does not seem to weigh heavily as a restriction in Latin America or Haiti
for two reasons. First, most of these laws are not enforced. Second,
only a handful of countries have such restrictions on the books.
B. Privacy
Legislators must reevaluate the current legal scheme of privacy that
seems to be so punitive and repressive. Most privacy laws are contained
in the criminal law of most Latin American countries. Privacy is
restricted nor conditional to the fulfillment of previous requirements of any nature that he cannot
or does not wish to fulfill." Id. Therefore, the requirement of prior registration with a ministry or
a university degree in order to work as a journalist is incompatible with the guarantee enshrined in
the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights because it amounts to a restriction on freedom
of expression.
86. See LANAO, supra note 2.
87. See Colom. Const. Ct. J. C-087/98 (Mar. 18, 1998) (declaring unconstitutional Law 51 of
1975).
88. See the country by country reports by the INTER AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, PRESS
FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 168 (2000) [hereinafter IAPA, ANNUAL
REPORT 2000].
89. See the current legislative bill No. 160-32 (Aug. 11, 2000) presented to the Chilean House
of Representatives. In particular, Article 5 mandates that all journalists must have a university
degree in order to practice their profession.
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becoming the cause of more and more litigation for the media and poses
greater concern for publishers because of the risk of being criminally
liable for invading someone's privacy. The public largely supports
efforts to impose such legal constraints on the media to protect their
privacy. The privacy schemes provide offenses ranging from divulging
private facts to the public, publishing private communications, and inter-
fering with a person's intimate life.90 In the last four years, Panama and
Paraguay have enacted Penal Codes which have included new criminal
law provisions punishing the violations of privacy. Curiously the word
"privacy" does not exist in the Spanish language dictionary approved by
the Real Academy of the Spanish Language.
V. RIGHT OF REPLY, ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND
OTHER RESTRICTIONS.
One of the major legal hurdles in the Western Hemisphere is the
right of reply law.91 The right of reply is conceived as a remedy for
those who may have been aggrieved by the publication of inaccurate
information. The injured party has the right to reply in the same
medium and sometimes under the same conditions of length and page or
section of that of the original publication. In some countries the right of
reply is enormously costly. Right of reply requires the media to choose
between fines, incarceration for contempt, or simply enduring costly
publications. 92 The forced publication in a news medium through the
90. See LANAO, supra note 2.
91. See AMERICAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 14 (1) ("anyone injured by inaccurate
or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated
medium of communication has the right to reply ... ").
92. Note that in most countries, rights of reply are mandatory with no exceptions. Judges
may impose anything from fines to jail time for those who do not comply with the forced
publication orders. In the recent past, Argentina has imposed the right of reply on the media
through application of the right of reply as set forth in the American Convention of Human Rights
article 14 (1). See, e.g., Press Law, art. 29-36 (Braz.) (gives judges the authority to order that the
reply be made personally by the offended party on the radio and not by the news company or
journalist); id. art. 68 (publication of the court ruling in the case of offenses against good name, at
the request of the plaintiff); Press Law of 2001 (Chile) (imposes an obligation to publish the text
of a clarification or correction in full as provided by the affected person); Decree No. 2591 of
1991 (Colom.) (the media may be forced to publish the response within a short time); Press Law
of 1944 (Colom.) (mandated right of reply); COSTA RICA CONST. art. 29 (right to reply); Press
Law of 1962, art. 19 (Dom. Rep.) (sets fines for non-compliance with the right of reply and
provides for recourse by the plaintiff); ECUADOR CONST. art. 23, 9 (provides for a right of
obligatory rectification, which due to its mandatory nature is tantamount to a right of reply); EL
SAL. CONST. art. 6 (right of reply); Press Law of 1980, art. 6 A-D (El Sal.) (as amended)
(publishers must within three days of receipt insert the reply from any person offended by a report
and must publish the reply in full); GUAT. CONST. art. 35 (offended persons have a right to have
their reply be published); Press Law, art. 37-47 (Guat.) (regulates everything concerning the rights
to clarification and rectification); id. art. 77 (requiring publication of information, when an ethics
tribunal finds criticism of a public official to have been unfounded and the tribunal's ruling is
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right of reply or retraction is common in Latin American countries. The
right to reply exists in almost all of the countries except for Canada,
United States, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico. In Argentina and
Costa Rica, the right of reply is enforced under Article 14 of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, which has become part of the domes-
tic law in those countries.
While the right of reply poses enormous costs for the publisher, the
cost for society as a whole may be too steep a price to pay. For exam-
ple, the United States Supreme Court concluded in a 1974 decision
regarding a right of reply for political candidates that the Florida right of
access statute interfered with editorial control and judgment and may
lead to editors abstaining from commenting on matters that are of gen-
eral interest to the public.93
On the other hand, only three Latin American countries offer some-
what adequate legal and procedural guarantees of access to official and
public information. The most common ways to obtain official informa-
tion are the right to petition, the laws of access, and habeas data. Habeas
data, however, is generally not available to the press because it is an
individualized and personal right available only to the interested par-
ties.94 In sum, neither individuals nor the press can access public infor-
mation adequately and effectively.
ordered to be published in full in the new medium concerned); id. art. 22 (radio and television
news programs are required to broadcast clarifications, explanations or corrections sent to them as
a result of inaccuracies, imputations, or charges); Press Law of 1986, art. 19 (Haiti) (obligatory for
news media to grant right of reply when an offended party requests publication or broadcast of his
reply, with non-compliance within seventy-two hours being punishable by closure of the news
medium or suspension of distribution); Press Law of 1958, art. 32 (Hond.) ("All persons and
companies have the right to defend themselves honorably against the imputation of charges and
criticism carried out by the press in order to clarify the facts imputed to them"); id. art. 35 ("The
written or spoken medium that, without justified cause, refuses to publish the reply or defense of
the claimant, or that delays its publication for more than three days, shall incur a fine of one
hundred to five hundred Lempiras"); id. art. 37 ("The text of the defense or reply shall be
published on the same page used in the publication that originated the defense"); Press Law of
1917, art. 27 (Mex.) (right of reply granted to the print media is forced publication;non-
compliance is punishable with one to nine months in jail); Law No. 11 of 1978, art. 11 (Pan.)
(provides for a right of clarification or rectification that, in fact, is a right of reply); PARA. CONST.
art. 28 (right of rectification or clarification requires a correction or clarification to be carried by
the same medium and with the same specifications that ran the original information); Decree No.
1262 of 1987, art. 4 (Para.) (right of rectification or reply is obligatory, and a court may order the
reply or rectification); Decree 26,775 of 1997, art. 2 (Peru) (states that every person must exercise
the right of correction within thirty days following the publication); Press Law, art. 7-17 (Urn.)
(right of reply); Press Law of 1994, art. I (Venez.) (establishes the obligation to correct promptly
and effectively all distortions or falsehoods in the news).
93. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Pat Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
94. See LANAO, supra note 2. Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Colombia have better mechanisms to
access public information. In reality, no Latin American legislation has a freedom of information
act or a public records law per se.
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VI. ELECTORAL BANS
Electoral bans are frequent in Latin America and often result in
criminal liability for those who do not comply with the law." Countries
have enacted electoral bans under the rationale that the media improp-
erly influences the voters during the days prior to the election. The
Court rejected the argument that voters are unduly influenced by opinion
polls, and therefore the infringement on freedom of expression could not
be justified.96
The issue of electoral bans is not easily resolved. Some scholars
believe that democracy and the media are intimately linked, particularly
during elections, because they view that the media can, in fact, influence
voters. In contrast, others believe that the people have the fundamental
right to know, and by restricting political coverage, the government is
gravely affecting such right. Whichever point of view one embraces, it is
largely evident that where the electoral ban exists, political debate
through propaganda is restrained.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
At stated before, there are commonalities in the legal systems
among Latin American countries regarding the press. These include
criminal libel, prior restraints and prohibited publications on a vast num-
ber of subjects, insult laws, judicial bans on press freedom, secrecy of
criminal court records, an absence of public records laws, and electoral
bans. There are other restrictions that escape the present analysis, such
as the lack of shield laws or ethical considerations. Although most of
the countries in the Western hemisphere are now democracies, a great
departure from the seventies and eighties, most of them have maintained
95. See LANAO, supra note 2. See also Electoral Law of 1997, art. 45 (Braz.) (bans during
election campaigns (from July 1, 1997 onwards) on the dissemination of favorable or non-
favorable commentary on political candidates on radio broadcast or the presentation of
propaganda); Law No. 18,700 of May 6, 1988, art. 30 (Chile) (electoral propaganda conducted
through the print medium, radio or television is banned three days before an election or
plebiscite); Electoral Law, art. 230 (El Sal.) (political propaganda is banned in the media within
the three days prior to election day on the election day itself); Electoral Law, art. 74 (Hond.) ("As
of five days before the elections, the political organization may only use radio or television
broadcasting, newspapers and other media to explain their platforms or to speak about their
candidates; they may not criticize the opposing platforms, nor the candidates. All public
demonstrations or rallies within the time specified above and all political propaganda are
forbidden the day of the elections."); C6DIGO C.P.D.F. art. 403 (Mex.) (prohibiting the disclosure
results of opinion polls during election period); ELECTORAL CODE, art. 178 (Pan.) (dissemination
of opinion polls in the ten days before elections, is a criminal offense); Law 834 of 1996 (Para.)
(prohibits the dissemination of electoral propaganda in the two days prior to elections and sets
severe criminal penalties); Law No. 6019 of 1989 (Uru.) (ban on political propaganda forty-eight
hours before elections).
96. See IAPA, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 88 at 33.
2002]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
or instituted press laws that prohibit reporting on a whole array of sub-
jects ranging from the internal activity and operations of government to
the private lives of their leaders. While some of these limitations on the
press may be well justified to protect national security or public order,
they all undermine self-governance. A press that is free to investigate
and criticize the government is absolutely essential in a nation that prac-
tices self-government and an educated and enlightened citizenry. "Self-
governance" is a concept that should be the goal of any democracy,
because this term implies the ability of a citizenry to make its own deci-
sions. To achieve this goal, societies require hard information. For
these reasons, we cherish the right to know.
As enshrined in Article 13 of the American Convention of Human
Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression.
This right includes freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice."9 7
Similarly, the importance of self-governance with respect to governance
itself, is demonstrated by Thomas Jefferson's view of the press:
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the
very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive
those papers and be capable of reading them.98
Jefferson's statement has great validity today in our hemisphere where
illiteracy rates are still high. The media should be able to freely report on
matters of general interest, and in particular, political matters.
One way such freedom can be achieved is by eliminating the insult
law provisions that shield government officials from criticism,
decriminalize libel, and develop civil law remedies for violations that
are now currently governed by criminal law such as privacy.
One cannot advocate the complete decriminalization of speech.
There are, however, still respectable arguments for maintaining criminal
law provisions that would punish the dissemination of information.
Similarly, not all speech can be protected. 99 Certainly, one cannot be an
97. Please take note that the United States signed the American Convention of Human Rights
in June of 1977. The treaty has not been internally ratified by Congress. See Organization of
American States, Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
(1998).
98. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), available at http://
www.Kvroshin.org/comments/200i7/23/23214/3438/18.
99. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (words that are likely to incite imminent
lawless action are unprotected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (words that
are offensive are unprotected).
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absolutist for complete free speech. Many of the laws already men-
tioned, however, should be eliminated or possibly treated as a tort under
the civil law concept of extra-contractual liability."° The latter proposal
might be a more feasible solution than attempting to incorporate
schemes from the United States into Latin American legal schemes.
Ideally, Latin American scholars should develop civil law guide-
lines for libel such as those present in the United States for the protec-
tion of privacy and harm to reputation or image.1 't It is a disturbing
trend to think that Latin American legislators see it fit to criminally pun-
ish the violations of privacy as a general rule.
If a coherent set of rules providing for the civil treatment of viola-
tions or abuses against privacy were adopted, the media would not be as
restrained or intimidated as under the current criminal legislation. Pub-
lic records laws, an effective system of registry of information and a
judicial process that can provide support in cases of denials are urgently
required in Latin America. The lack of such systems not only affects the
people's right to know but also considerably restrains investigative
reporting.
In the area of press freedom, much work needs to be done with the
judges to broaden their perspectives and understanding of the roles of
the media, government officials, and civil society. Attorneys also need
to become more aware of alternative methods of protecting speech and
other fundamental rights such as honor and one's own image. Some
members of the legal community seem to become apprehensive when
discussing concepts such as open, uninhibited, and robust speech or
when the possibility of eliminating criminal libel is suggested. It is
inevitable to conclude that Latin America does not embrace the same
democratic tradition or vision of the role of the press that other Western
democracies do. In fact, some legislators seem committed to regulating
the press and continue drafting bills that include dubious terms that seem
to have the word "censorship" lurking behind them. Despite the efforts
of these legislators, terms such as the "right to accurate information" and
the "social duty or responsibility of the media" are creeping into several
100. Extra-contractual liability is a theory developed in early Roman Law that defined the
basic premise of he who causes damages is liable. It is a fundamental notion in civil law for civil
reparation.
101. See RESTATEMENT (2d) OF TORTS § 652A-652D (1977). The classification of invasion of
privacy into four separate torts is generally credited to Dean Prosser. See William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). See also SACK, supra note 58, at 12-2 (describing the
four torts of invasion of privacy). As noted by Sack, two torts are closely related to defamation:
publicity placing a person in a false light, and publication of truthful but embarrassing private
facts. The other two are less related to defamation. Truth or publication has little bearing on the
torts. They are intrusion upon seclusion, which is more related to trespass.
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new constitutions.10 2
Perhaps, the need to develop a standard of review to protect free-
dom of expression is required. Constitutionally, few countries in the
hemisphere have a standard of constitutional protection that places the
burden on the government to justify regulation of the content of infor-
mation. For example, in the United States issues relating to First
Amendment law require the government to make a showing of the com-
pelling governmental interest justifying the regulation and that the mea-
sure drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve that objective. In contrast,
Latin American judges are not compelled to undertake any type of judi-
cial scrutiny to determine whether the regulation is unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding the democratic traditions of many Latin American
countries, many lack the understanding of the importance of deregulat-
ing the press and the exercise of journalism. On the other hand, it may
be the general public's distrust of the press which provides support for
legislation protecting privacy. The wide gamut of prior restraints and
prohibited publications that were enumerated in this paper is outdated
and the legal system in this field requires a complete overhaul to effec-
tively deal with these issues. Rules, theories, and guidelines must be
devised in areas of privacy and, in general, censorship. It is not clear as
to how to go about creating such a legal scheme but certainly criminal
law sanctions is not the answer. Let us remember what Justice Benja-
min Cardozo said in Palko v. Connnecticut, "This is true, for illustration,
of freedom of thought, and of speech. Of that freedom one may say that
it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom."' 03
102. COLOM. CONST. art. 20; ECUADOR CONST. art. 81 (1998); HAITI CONST. art. 28.2 (the duty
of journalists to determine the veracity of the information); NICARA. CONST. art. 66; PARA. CONST.
art. 28; VENEZ. CONST. art. 57 (referring to the duty of contributing to the formation of the
citizenry).
103. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
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